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ABSTRACT 
Evidence from developing countries has shown that relative concern matters for wellbeing. 
Overconsumption of positional goods due to status seeking contributes to an overall loss of 
welfare. Rural western China serves as an ideal destination to observe relative concern and 
induced social phenomenon. In Guizhou province, the negative effect of positional spending is 
even more intense when households living close to subsistence are compelled to donate blood to 
keep up with the Jones. Utilizing a census-type household survey data in 26 natural villages in 
rural Guizhou, we find that poverty leads to blood donation, especially through differentiated 
poverty depth. Meanwhile, social status seeking is intensified through income inequality, relative 
deprivation, and positional spending within a reference group, which renders more blood 
donation participation and at a higher level. The intensified blood donation is more saliently 
induced by relative deprivation than by income inequality, suggesting that further attention 
should be paid to what the most suitable inequality measure is in policy design or evaluation. 
The result is robust to different measures of relative deprivation. Further, the herd effect of blood 
donation exists, suggesting weak agents in making blood donation decisions. Interestingly, 
shortly after shocks such as unanticipated gift giving expenditure and livestock death, people are 
more likely to donate blood, while they generally do not engage in blood donation to cover 
anticipated large social expenditure such as house building and wedding. 
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1. Introduction 
A longstanding assumption in neoclassic economics is that an agent’s utility depends solely 
on the absolute level of well-being. However, recent evidence from developing countries has 
shown that relative concern over the others’ consumption matters. This reality has focused 
attention on positional goods—those for which relative position matters most. 
Positional consumption is considered as a vehicle facilitating social networks. However, the 
concern is that households allocate too much resource to positional goods, instead of non-
positional goods, which in turn contributes to an overall welfare loss. The pressure to spend 
lavishly in many social occasions, such as festivals, funerals, gift giving, house building and 
weddings is particularly strong, since such. Such pervasive conspicuous consumption and status 
seeking behavior reflect the high value accorded to positional concerns. There is a critical issue 
of individual rationality versus collective irrationality. The fact that “positional externalities” 
compels villagers to spend lavishly on positional goods to avoid becoming isolated from local 
networks is thus a problem that is particularly acute for households living close to subsistence. 
Income disparity itself might further worsen the well-being of the poor through being 
relatively deprived within their reference groups, rather than only working through well-
recognized income inequality (for example, the Gini coefficient) that everyone feels the same. In 
this process, the poorer a household is, the higher share of income it needs to distract from more 
urgent non-positional consumption, which renders a stronger feeling of being surpassed on the 
social ladder. Empirical evidence has shown a negative relationship between relative deprivation 
and health outcomes as well as health behavior. What is still unknown is whether being relatively 
deprived induces people to search for unsustainable ways to compensate, such as exchanging 
blood for cash. 
In some rural areas in China, there is limited opportunity for households to increase farm 
income. Opportunities to earn non-farm income are also severely limited, and the inequality of 
non-farm earnings (including remittance) is particularly serious. To the poor, the need for cash 
income to avoid being relatively deprived and facilitate gift exchange and social spending has 
compelled many households to engage in the practice of donating blood. Worse still, faced with 
shocks (such as unanticipated social spending, natural disasters, livestock deaths, and diseases), 
donating blood becomes their last resort. First, it is fairly easy to compensate cash shortage in a 
short time period, and it seems to the poor that donating blood is not harmful. Second, as a   - 4 -
supply-side market, this activity does not depend on labor demand conditions. Further, it is 
usually the case that the poorer households are, the lower qualities of labor they have. However, 
the blood (or fluid) labor among the poor and the rich share equal quality and price, which 
renders the poor comparative advantage in donating blood rather than supplying labor. 
What make the blood donation market special? At first glance, people may feel 
uncomfortable or even outrageous, which are absent in a regular good market. Those feelings 
reflect concern over poverty and inequality in the market relations. Moreover, concern over weak 
agents exists that those who act in the market might not be the people who bear the consequences 
of those actions. Besides, possible extreme outcomes accounts for another great concern. 
Repeated blood donation undermines donateers’ long-term wellbeing and leads to persistent 
poverty because of its lasting harmful effects. For example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is proved 
exacerbated following blood plasma donation. Among women of reproductive age, blood 
donation might undermine cognitive performance and work productivity of mothers and their 
children. The standard neoclassical economics wisdom seems to vote for banning this market, 
which might not be a good answer. Induced by such an attempted ban, the forces underlying the 
market may not disappear but intensify. Intuition tells us that possible effective actions must 
always be supplemented by direct measures to reduce poverty and inequality which lead to the 
market in the first place. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to address four major issues. First, we analyze whether and to 
what extent poverty induces blood donation; second, we verify whether blood donation reflects 
income inequality, including inequality that everyone in a reference group feels the same and 
relative deprivation that everyone feels differently; third, to capture social status seeking, 
positional spending within reference groups is measured to test whether it aggravates blood 
donation; besides, we test whether the herd effect of blood donation exists. Together with status 
seeking, the herd effect might worsen relative deprivation and reflect the weakness of agency in 
making decisions. 
To our knowledge, this is among the first studies to addressing the economic meanings of 
blood donation to the poor and the relatively deprived. While blood donation behavior has been 
documented in sociological, philosophical, ethical, anthropological literatures and popular novels 
and also mentioned in economic papers, we have not seen any paper in economics solely 
focusing on this behavior. Meanwhile, while all the relevant literature uses individual cases as   - 5 -
their basis of studies, this paper is primarily based on a local survey of all individuals. As far as 
we know, it is the first data set that includes extensive information on blood donation. 
Importantly, blood donation is rich in economic meanings: first, blood donation 
participation and level are parallel to regular labor supply decisions, except that every individual, 
regardless of the poor and the rich, is generally endowed with equalized blood quality but 
unequal human resource. The differed labor provision and blood donation help us further 
understand the lives of being poor; second, the study of blood donation behavior might enrich 
our understanding of the differences in inequality and relative deprivation. In certain contexts, 
traditional inequality measures might underestimate or even conceal the real effect of inequality 
on deprivation and the resulting blood donation; third, blood donation behavior might help us 
understand risk management strategy of being poor, which might be reflected in the link between 
shocks and blood donation; finally, the herd behavior of blood donation and gift giving is 
interesting to explore.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present existing literature on 
blood donation market, relative concern, and relative deprivation measurement; In Section 3, the 
recent surge in status seeking and blood donation in rural China is documented; Section 4 derives 
illustrative models to explore relationships between key factors and lays out our empirical 
strategy; Section 5 describes data and presents summary statistical analysis; Section 6 reports 
initial estimation results on blood donation participation function and blood donation level 
function; Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Understanding Blood Donation Market  
What makes blood donation market different from market for apples? This question has 
been puzzling social scientists for quite a long time. Faced with this kind of markets the standard 
neoclassical economics seems to cut no ice. For example, getting rid of these markets or banning 
them might not be the best or only answer to them. With attempted bans, forces underlying the 
market may not disappear but intensify. However, people share the similar feeling that market 
operation and exchange often evoke contradictory emotions. To quote Kanbur (2004): 
“Certain markets evoke popular discomfort, distrust and even outrage. Trade in arms, 
drugs, toxic waste, child labor and body parts, for example, elicits these reactions to different   - 6 -
Degrees… Three key parameters—extremity, agency and inequality—have a bearing on our 
intuitive reactions and serve to differentiate markets. The more extreme are the likely outcomes 
of a market, the further is the agent who acts in the market from agents who bear the 
consequences of those actions, and the greater is the degree of inequality in market relations, the 
more likely it is that the operation of the market will provoke discomfort.” 
Possible effective actions must always be supplemented by direct measures to reduce 
poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation which lead to the markets in the first place. 
Meanwhile, effective measures should be based on careful evaluation of differing characteristics 
in each individual market. 
Existing literature on blood donation market focuses on two aspects. The first category of 
studies analyzes participants’ micro behavior. Shao (2006) builds an ethnographic account of 
blood donation and HIV/AIDS among different people in several villages in China. Using a 
signaling behavior model, Seabright (2004) finds that a qualitative and discontinuous difference 
between gifts and sales, or free participation in civic activities and participation at a price award, 
can emerge between individuals even when there is no discontinuity in individual’s types. 
Kanbur (2004) argues that there exist three key characterizing parameters, extremity of outcomes, 
weakness of agency, and inequality in the market relations, that capture whether a specific 
market is noxious or not. Satz (2004) reviews four approaches in contemporary political thought 
to the limits of market and defends the democratic egalitarian approach to market. Besides the 
three important features that characterize noxious markets in Kanbur (2004), Satz (2004) 
discusses how such markets undermine values and procedures that are crucial to a liberal 
democracy. Accordingly to Kanbur (2004) and Satz (2004), we next show that the donating of 
blood qualifies as a noxious market on grounds of extreme outcomes from long-term donation, 
possible weak agency problems, and worsening inequality. 
First, blood donation might suffer from extremity of outcomes. Unlike the donation of body 
parts that cannot be renewed by the body, the donating of blood is seemingly less irreversible 
and extreme. However, persistent blood donation has been found harmful to health outcomes in 
the long run, which undermine blood donators’ wellbeing and lead to persistent poverty. To labor 
force, frequent blood donations often lead to much less energy in conducting farm work or off-
farm work and serious reliance on donating blood. Sometimes, participants are fearfully lean and 
even cannot stand still for a few minutes. To women of reproductive age, frequent blood   - 7 -
donation might undermine cognitive performance and work productivity of two generations 
through higher rates of anemia. Particularly, blood donation behavior even induces high 
probability of HIV/AIDS infection in areas that blood plasma is usually collected. The 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS epidemic caused by donating blood plasma in some areas deprives 
thousands of lives every year. 
Second, blood donation reflects weakness of agency. It is not reasonable to assume that an 
individual has perfect negative information on long-term blood donation. Even if information is 
not an issue, extremely bad health outcome tomorrow might not be really felt today. Put another 
way, uncertainty and time lag break the tie between observed and actual consequences. 
Meanwhile, under miserable family conditions in China, blood donation behavior is based on a 
household’s decision on behalf of its members who are responsible and feel guilty to make their 
self beneficial decisions. Further, deception sometimes makes agency problems even worse. In 
some areas, for example, the less informed and the elderly are usually deceived to donate blood 
to alleviate locally pervasive diseases such as rheumatism. Finally, blood donation decisions of 
people around each other often exert great influence on an agent’s decision. It might be that other 
people’s pursuit of blood cash to finance more status seeking expenditure induces an individual 
to follow suit, given that it is “easy” with no other alternatives. 
Further, blood donation behavior shows inequality in market relations. Now suppose that 
agents are not weak and participants truly recognize all possible consequences, how does 
economic inequality act on heterogeneous agents? Firstly, blood donation market power is 
asymmetrically distributed, i.e. purchasers (blood plasma collection station) are fewer and are 
regionally monopolistic. To the contrary, blood donateers have very few alternatives other than 
donating blood. Secondly, the inequality is also reflected by the fact that different parties might 
suffer quite differently in the absence of blood market. Extremely negative outcomes might 
occur to blood donateers, but not blood collectors. With blood market, this fluid body part goes 
from the poor who badly need money to survive to the rich who can afford to enjoy the fruit. 
Thirdly, in many cases the poor are compelled to donate blood under the pressure of feeling 
unequal, being relatively deprived and isolated from social networks.  
The second category of studies focuses on blood market efficiency. Titmuss (1970) and 
others (Solow, 1971; Arrow, 1972) compare blood market efficiency between blood collected 
from unpaid versus paid volunteers. Titmuss (1970) shows that the American system, where part   - 8 -
of blood donors are paid, is less efficient both quantitatively (supply problems, large waste) and 
qualitatively (many post-transfusion accidents) than the British system, which relied on unpaid 
volunteers. Besides, Titmuss calls for “giving altruistic” in a world of radically distant relations 
and with no expectation of anything in return, both financial and moral reward. Arrow (1972) 
acknowledges that market was only one means among many to distribute goods. He agrees with 
Titmuss that in this specific case it was inferior to unpaid volunteer action. Solow (1971) accuses 
Titmuss’ opponents narrow-minded economicism. However, Arrow refuses to accept the idea 
that a mix between the market and giving would hurt giving. Solow also criticizes Titmuss for 
comparing two extreme market cases.  
The studies on blood market efficiency are closely linked to the study of micro behavior. At 
the micro level, bought blood is collected from individuals badly need cash. At the market level, 
bought blood has the effect of reversing redistribution in that the well-off benefits from the blood 
of the poor. Commercial blood stations are usually opened in impoverished districts, meaning 
that blood collected by market means is of lower quality than by unpaid volunteers. Generally, 
unpaid volunteers have no reason to lie about their health or medical records, which might not be 
true for people who exchange blood for money. 
2.2 Relative Concern and Well-Being
1 
Why do some people rather than the others rely on donating blood? A part of this issue 
relates to the understanding of relative concern. A longstanding assumption in traditional 
economics is that an agent’s utility depends solely on the absolute level of well-being
2, generally 
measured by consumption. However, an idea was implicitly put forwarded on the publication of 
The Wealth of Nations in 1776 that people should be endowed with the ability to appear in public 
without shame. Dated back to Veblen’s seminal work in 1899, a few people started to believe 
that utility or happiness depends in part on the comparison of one’s own consumption to that of 
others, and it was first formally modeled by Duesenberry (1949) in his relative income 
hypothesis. Since 1970’s, compelling evidences on relative concerns have been accumulated 
which include Easterlin (1974), Sen (1983), Frank (1985), Van de Stadt et al. (1985) among 
others. 
                                                 
1 As we show later, relative concern is reflected in more dimensions than positional spending. However, in the 
current literature, people focus on positional spending. Therefore, we briefly review relevant literature. 
2 The permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis are two typical examples.   - 9 -
Recently, the idea of relative concern has been broadly applied to explain numerous 
interesting social and economic phenomenons in developed societies. For example, Frank (1997) 
notes that in the U.S. counties with high income inequality, intense competition for social status 
leads to higher median housing prices, higher personal bankruptcy rates, and a higher incidence 
of divorce. Bowles and Park (2002) find that total working hours were positively associated with 
higher inequality in OECD countries over time. Other evidences include Clark and Oswald 
(1996), Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), Stutzer (2004), 
Luttmer (2005). Frank and Levine (2008) further find that relative concern could well explain the 
link between inequality and observed disparities in international savings rates, which were not 
predicted by traditional consumption theories. Frank and Levine (2008) define “Expenditure 
Cascade” in an economy where every agent except the richest one judges own behavior 
according to others closest above them. 
Contrary to Veblen’s argument that no class of society, not even the abjectly poor, foregoes 
all customary conspicuous consumption, Heffetz (2007) shows that relative concern through 
conspicuous spending is only relevant for rich context. However, evidence from designer-label 
goods consumption in Bolivia (Kempen, 2003), festivals’ budget in India (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2007), “splendid” funerals in Ghana (Economist, 2007), relative deprivation and migration in 
Mexico (Stark et al., 1991), bride-prices and dowries in south Asia and Africa (Rao, 1993; 
Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002), marriage payments in Bangladesh (Anderson, 2007), and 
community level consumption in Nepal (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008) show strong support for 
relative concern. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) further notice that isolation from market is 
associated with a significant increase in relative concern. 
2.3 The Measurement of Relative Deprivation 
Besides shown in positional consumption and income inequality, relative concern is also 
reflected by relative deprivation among people of a reference group. Relative deprivation is 
originally proposed by Runciman (1966), who argues that one is deprived if the others in the 
group possess something that one does not have. Easterlin (1974) proposed a simple model to 
incorporate consumption norms into individual’s utility maximization framework whereby utility 
of individual i depends on i’s consumption relative to a weighted average of other people’s 
consumption. Yitzhaki (1979) develops the definition by viewing income as personal possessions 
and deriving the relationship between relative deprivation and income inequality. Chakravarty   - 10 -
(1990) defined relative deprivation as “utility foregone” because of not possessing the economic 
variables under consideration. Similar to Easterlin (1974), Cooper et al. (2001) proposed a model 
whereby individual’s utility depends on the absolute quantity and the quality of a good consumed 
as well as on the quantity and quality of status good consumed relative to reference or peer group 
members. Wildman (2003a, 2003b) shows the relationship among average health, health 
inequalities, absolute level of income, and income inequalities, and links absolute and relative 
income hypotheses in the production of health. 
In Yitzhaki (1979) and Wildman (2003a), the level of deprivation experienced by an 
individual i with income y relative to another individual with income z is formulated as, 
(; ) Diy z y = −    if  y z <   or 
                                                     ( ; ) 0 Diy =          if  y z ≥  
Based on this form, one would feel more deprived as the number of individuals in society 
with higher income z increases. Thus, an overall measure of deprivation for the individual i is 
given by summing the differences in income and weighting it with the proportion of people with 
higher income than the individual i. Accordingly, Li and Zhu (2006) define relative deprivation 






=− ∑    ji yy ∀ >  
/ ii RDI RDA y =  
Through normalization by N, the number of people in their reference groups, RDA adopts 
normalized total income of other group members who earn more than i does to measure the 
relative deprivation of person i with income  i y . RDI is defined as the ratio of RDA relative to 
person i’s own income. 
Intuitively following the well-known measure of Gini coefficient, Wildman (2003b) 
proposes a measure of relative deprivation for an individual with income y at the provincial level 
and stratifies it by urban and rural regions as follows: 
1 () [ 1 () ] [ 1 () ] y dF F y y F y μ = −− − 
where μ  denotes mean income and the population is ranked by income.  1() Fy is the cumulative 
proportion of total income up to the income y and  () Fy is the cumulative proportion of the 
population up to the individual with income y.   - 11 -
Deaton (2001) proposes a measure of relative deprivation for an individual i with income x 
at the provincial level and stratifies it by urban and rural regions: 
(1/ ) ( ) ( )
T x
x
y xd F y μ − ∫    or   (1/ )[1 ( )][ ( ) ] Fx x x μμ
+ − −  
where μ  denotes mean income for those in the reference group, 
T x  is the highest income in the 
group. F(y) is the cumulative distribution of incomes among individuals in the group, and  ( ) x μ
+  
is the average income of those with income higher than the individual with income x. In sum, the 
measure is the normalized difference between the average income of those with higher income 
and income x weighted by the proportion of those with income higher than the individual i.   
In other measures, Li and Zhu (2006) use individual’s centile rank of income within their 
reference groups. Different from the aforementioned measures, the rank ignores the magnitude of 
income differences among individuals. Thus, centile rank contains less information on relative 
deprivation than other measures. Meanwhile, while larger values in RDA, RDI, Deaton_RD, and 
Wildman_RD indicate higher degrees of relative deprivation, higher centile rank means a lower 
degree. Besides, unlike the Gini coefficient, which is bounded between 0 and 1, relative 
deprivation measures are not limited in value and therefore have larger variations in the sample. 
Importantly, while income inequality is an aggregate measure of income distribution for a 
community or the whole society, relative income measures are individual specific. Relative 
deprivation reflects a person’s position or relative to the others within a reference group. In a 
densely populated and isolated rural society, residents usually compare themselves with others 
within the natural village. Thus, we can define sound reference groups and construct relative 
deprivation indexes at the natural village level.   
 
3. Status Seeking and Blood Donation in Rural China 
How does relative concern affect densely populated and isolated rural society in 
contemporary China? First, it is important to note that there have been fierce status competitions 
throughout Chinese history, especially since the agriculture civilization. In recent decades, 
economic and structural transformation in China has been followed by escalation in conspicuous 
consumptive investment, particularly housing, but no increases in productive investment that 
would secure durable increases in welfare (Brauw and Rozelle, 2008). Relative share of rural 
residents’ incomes allocated to gift-giving, dowry, bride price, and funerals, are thought of as   - 12 -
vehicles for social prestige that might challenge social status (Yan, 1996; Liu, 2000). Such 
spending also facilitates social networks, which may be relied upon for mutual assistance, 
personal financing, or other forms of help. 
On the other hand, the welfare consequences of “positional externalities” associated with 
status seeking are severe for Chinese households living close to subsistence. The highly 
ritualized practices of gift-giving compel villagers to offer gifts in order to avoid isolation from 
local networks. Generally, farm income is limited and nonfarm income is unequal and favorable 
to the rich, for poor residents large portions of income facilitating gift exchange cannot be 
compensated without unsustainable economic activities, such as donating blood. The isolated 
context further deprives people’s equal opportunities to migrate out and acquire remittance, and 
dense population aggravates status seeking activities. Brown et al. (2008) recorded oral evidence 
during field work that inflows of remittances to some households set in motion status contests 
with adverse consequences of the others through long-term blood donation.  
In China, blood is mainly supplied by voluntary donations. However, in Guizhou, Henan, 
and some other remote rural areas, blood stations provide cash compensation to blood 
donateers.
3 Once the plasma is removed, the blood is re-infused. It is prohibited to donate blood 
more than once every two weeks (Asia Catalyst, 2007). In August 2004, the State Administration 
of Taxation issued a new stipulation that the purchase of human blood is not subject to tax-free 
agricultural produce and should not be calculated at 13 % of the purchase price for the deduction 
of purchases VAT as applied to agricultural produce. Accordingly, Shao (2006) argues what 
makes human blood an “agricultural product” in the first place. Economic reform in China began 
with the agricultural reform in the late 1970s. After the release of production incentives and 
chemical fertilizer usage in the 1980s, individual peasants are faced with more and more price 
fluctuations in the market both for inputs and outputs as a result of decollectivization. More 
market fluctuation and less arable land per capita due to the increasing population make 
agricultural production risky and unprofitable. Ironically, it is the economic liberalization, which 
once droved the reform process, that deprives the poor of any power to retain their blood labor, 
leaving them only profound frustration over its absence.  
Recently, Guizhou province has been a new supplier of blood plasma for the heel of the 
Henan Province in China (Yin, 2006). In 2006, there were 25 blood plasma stations in Guizhou, 
                                                 
3 For example, in rural Guizhou, people get 80 Yuan nutrition subsidy for the plasma contained in 580 cc of blood.   - 13 -
which supplied 40% of total blood plasma, giving it the largest market in China. Meanwhile, 
blood donation stations in the county were shut down in 2006 due to Hepatitis C contamination 
and predatory behavior of over extracting blood plasma, some residents continued to rely on 
donating blood, often traveling outside the county to make donation. 
 
4. Illustrative Models and Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Poverty, Shocks, and Blood donation 
In an underdeveloped local context, it is usually the case that people donate blood at the 
same price,
4 while their human resources vary a lot, implying an equalized “fluid labor” price (p) 
and unequal normal labor price (w).  
First, it is easily shown that how poverty might affect blood donation decisions. Assume a 
household has two types of labor resources, normal labor (l) and fluid labor (b). The utility 
function decreases in the two types of labor supply. (1-l) denotes leisure, which enhances utility 
level. Assume a utility maximization of a Cobb-Douglas function, and we normalize the price of 
consumption goods bundle (c) to be 1. 
,, max ( , , ) (1 ) (1 )
clbUclb A c l b
α βγ =− −  
 s.t.    a pb wl c + + =                                            (1) 
where the constraint is equivalent to  p w a b p l w c + + = − + − + ) 1 ( ) 1 (.   a denotes all other 
income sources. The first order condition shows that when w is lower for the poor, they tend to 
substitute b  for l. Put another way, they tend to supply more blood and less normal labor 
relative to the rich, as they have comparative advantage in donating blood. The level of blood 























*  (2) 
People in poverty are usually vulnerable to shocks. Assume a two-period utility 
maximization model where there is a shock, for example, livestock death, natural disaster, or big 
disease, at the end of period 1. The utility maximization for period 1 is unchanged. Faced with 
                                                 
4 In this paper, our census-type survey covered three administrative villages (i.e. 26 natural villages). All the 
households are faced with the only one blood market that sets up a unique blood compensation price once blood 
donateers pass a pre-donation test. Generally, most people easily pass that test, partly reflecting the current situation 
that market blood supply is in severe shortage relative to market demand. Refer to section 3 for more detailed 
information.   - 14 -
the shock, the household would change its optimal choice in period 2. It is important to note that 
household normally cannot change labor supply immediately, because it also depends on labor 
market demand condition. However, people can easily increase their fluid labor supply within a 
short time, because blood plasma is in high demand. Thus, the new choice variable is goods 
consumption (c) and blood donation (b), while l is given before shocks. Shocks can also directly 
influence utility through ( ) Ss. Consumption is negative in shocks, and blood donation is positive 
in response to shocks.  ( ) f s denotes probability of shocks with various degrees. 
, m a x (() ,,() ,) [ ()( 1 )( 1 () ) () ] ()
cb s
s
EU c s l b s s Ac s l b s S s f s
αβ γ =− − ∑  
 s.t.    ( ) (1 ) (1 ( )) cs w l p bs a w p +− +− = + +    s ∀   
4.2 Relative Concern, Positional Spending, Inequality, and Blood Donation 
 It is assumed that people care about their own wellbeing relative to the others. We define 
i x c  as own consumption of a positional good for individual i, 
i y c  as that individual’s 
consumption of a non-positional good,  ˆ x c as positional spending by others in the reference group, 
i Z  as a vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables, p as the relative price of good x, 
and  i I  as income. Agent i’s utility maximization problem 
ˆ
, max ( , , , ; , )
ii
xy ii
xx y i ccUc c c Z pI  
 s.t. 
ii ix y I pc c = +  (3) 
We assume there is a sub-utility function () S capturing status benefits, which is determined 
by differences between
i x c and ˆ x c .
5 Besides, there is a sub-utility function () V capturing 
neoclassical utility from own consumption. α is a weighting parameter between the two utilities. 
  ˆ () ( 1 ) ( , )
ii i ix x x y US c c V c c α α =− + −  and 01 α ≤ ≤  (4) 
Solving for FOC, / 0
i ix Uc ∂∂ = , then differentiating yields: 
         (5) 
 
                                                 
5 We can also define a sub-utility function () S ⋅ capturing status benefits as 
^
(/ ) i SS xx =  or  () i SF x =  that 
captures ordinal rank of the agent in the reference group. 
2
ˆ (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
i x xx
x xx xx xy yy
c S
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If 0 xx S < , that is, the marginal value of status falls as one has more of it, then the 
denominator of the RHS is definitely negative, and the numerator is negative. Therefore, it 
reflects the essential characteristic of a “follower” ( ˆ /0
i xx cc ∂ ∂>), i.e. status seeking generates 
positional spending as strategic complements. 
Next we introduce normal labor and fluid labor in the utility maximization. In accordance 
with equation (4), we define components of a utility function S (⋅) and V (⋅) in log forms.   
(1 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (,, , ) [ ( 1) ( 1) ][ (, () ) ]
yy xx x x
xx x x
VS
yy Uc c lb e e A c c l b Sc Fc
αα αα α α α αβ γ α α −⋅ ⋅ − == − −            (6) 
where the utility function (4) is achieved after a monotonic transformation. The first part denotes 
utility from own consumption, and the second part denotes utility from relative consumption and 
the induced status. Here 
x
x c
α  denotes status consumption, and  ()
x
x Fc
α  denotes percentage of 
households with lower social status. 
It is shown in equation (5) that positional spending of good 
x c  by people in the reference 
group increases the positional spending of the other people. To simplify the following analysis, 
we assume  0 α =  and discuss the impact of relative concern on blood donation through 
changing x α . The higher  x α  is, the higher proportion of income on status seeking there will be. 
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where marginal difference in fluid labor and normal labor supply is ambiguous in sign. However, 
it is easily shown that the poor usually have higher proportion of income contributed by blood 
donation. After normalizing xy r α αβ ++ + , the elasticity of scale, to 1, it is found that the ratio 
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of blood subsidy among the poor is larger, because poor households usually have smaller share 
of income enjoying no blood donation r, lower other income a, and lower wage w. 
* pb p
Ratio of blood income= (1 )
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How does inequality influence positional spending and the resulting blood donation? The 
link between inequality and positional spending is theoretically ambiguous, partially because a 
more unequal income distribution might reduce status seeking among the middle class and 
aggravate status seeking in each of the two tails of distribution. Also, it might be caused by 
heterogeneity that some people are highly competitive and others are conformists, and people 
differ in their pride and compassion towards the poor around them. Meanwhile, inequality might 
have direct impact on blood donation decisions other than through status competition. In sum, 
the relationship between inequality and blood donation behavior remains open for empirical test, 
particularly in the context of rapid changes in income distribution within reference groups. 
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
The primary results in this paper focus on estimating what determine household choices of 
blood donation. Three issues arise immediately when using typical cross-sectional data to 
explore these relationships empirically. First, nearly all surveys rely on sampling, and they might 
not capture the full picture of relative status within groups. Second, simultaneity concerns may 
be present since a household’s behavior might directly alter aggregate indicators within reference 
groups. Third, reference groups are usually not easily identified (Chen and Zhang, 2009). We 
alleviate these problems by utilizing a census-type data set in a remote mountainous region
6 and 
subtract an individual household’s value from the aggregated level indicators in the reference 
group to predict household behavior.
7 We assume that reference groups are at natural village 
                                                 
6 Guizhou is a typical area in the world with Karst landform. 
7 We assume that individual behavior varies with the median feature of group behavior other than the mean, since 
median behavior is not suffered from extreme values. More importantly, it is closer to the real world that people 
normally follow the general public around them in social spending or deciding whether to participate in donating 
blood and to what degree. However, the validity of this treatment is based on the assumption that the researcher a 
priori knows the group with whom a person may interact. For more detailed way to solve simultaneity problem in 
principle, please also refer to Manski (2000).    - 17 -
level.
8 Besides, there is no need to care about goods price and blood price vector, since the 26 
surveyed natural villages share one goods market and blood bank, and per unit compensations 
from blood donation are the same across individuals over time. 
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where  r i Bloodpart , in both (12) and (13) denotes whether or not a household i in natural village r 
donates blood. In order to test whether donating blood is a poverty issue, we use the information 
of income, poverty line.  r i Income ,  denotes per capita income of household i in village r 
excluding blood donation compensation.  i povline  indicates whether or not a household i is in 
poverty by comparing per capita income without blood donation with the official poverty line. 
The interactive term between  i povline and  r i Income ,  tests whether the deeper a household is in 
poverty, the higher probability it donates blood.
9 
r Gini  is used to test whether inequality in a village r influences household blood donation 
participation. However, the Gini coefficient only captures inequality at the village level. Thus, 
we also estimate equation (13) including one of the five major relative deprivation indexes 
r i RDindex ,  each time. While all the relative deprivation indexes developed in the literature are 
based on income information within a reference group, in this paper we try to test other aspects 
of relative concern, i.e. the effects of collective behavior  r behaviorRD  on a household’s blood 
donation participation. Specifically, we include in different scenarios the median level gift 
spending, the gift giving participation rate, the median level blood donation compensation, or the 
                                                 
8 Reference groups are most likely to be defined at the natural village level, because they are evolved naturally 
without political command, but through generations of residence. In the surveyed natural villages, there are 30 
households on average, which form a close link connecting each other. Usually, the majority of residents retain 
certain kinds of kinship within a natural village. Recent migration exerts little influence on reference groups. First, 
more often only some members migrate, not the whole family. Second, even migrants themselves are not likely to 
change reference groups because of the Hukou system and all the other discriminative policies. In urban China, rural 
migrants usually join rural migrants’ social networks, which differ from urban residents’ networks. That is also the 
reason why rural residents tend to migrate, considering higher absolute income and no worse relative deprivation in 
the short run. However, further studies on long-term migration and changes in reference groups are needed.  
9 Blood donation in the long run may prevent people from supplying quality labor, which renders lower income and 
higher probability of poverty. However, at least in the short run this link is weak. Consistent with our results from 
the illustrative model and survey data, people may simultaneously supply more blood and labor in the short run.   - 18 -
blood donation participation rate in the reference group. To alleviate the potential simultaneity 
problem, we subtract each household i from these indicators of collective action when we test 
their effects on household blood donation participation. 
   r i, Χ is a set of household level and village level control variables, including household 
head’s education, ethnicity, party membership, share of family members who migrate out, 
villages dummy, whether a household in poverty has member(s) in serious illness, and whether 
or not all family members are seriously disabled. In the specifications later, we also consider ex 
post information on shocks and big social events. Specifically, we consider whether one or two 
years before or after 2004 marriages of male or female family members, house building, family 
member death, serious diseases, natural disasters, and deaths of livestock might affect household 
blood donation participation. 
Our second objective is to estimate two equations on the level of blood donation: 
,0 1 ,2 3 ,
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where  , ir Bloodvol denotes blood donation volume of household i in village r. Although equations 
(14) and (15) share the similar settings with equations (12) and (13), they differ slightly in 
defining r behaviorRD and , ir Y .  r behaviorRD  in equations (14) and (15) add in explanations of 
blood donation volume using level of collective actions, such as median blood donation volume 
and median gift spending within the reference group, instead of dummy variables. Besides, we 
finally test the effects of shocks and social events using level variables. All the ex post 
information of shocks and social events comes from our 2006 survey, when we asked each 
household for this information from 2002 to 2006 (i.e. two years before and after 2004). This 
information is reliable, because local residents usually keep detailed records of expenditures on 
big social events and gift giving to the others within a long time period. 
 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Data Source   - 19 -
The data set for our proposed study comes from a census-type rural household panel survey 
in three administrative villages in Puding County, Guizhou Province, Western China.
10 Puding 
County, located in the central part of the poorest Guizhou province in China, is an ideal choice 
for studying rural poverty since it is a median level county in Guizhou, which suggests that its 
income profile is representative of Guizhou. More importantly, it is geographically isolated as 
well as multi-ethnic populated
11. Currently, Guizhou provides the largest market share of blood 
plasma in China. 
In Chengguan Township of Puding County, all the 805 households in three administrative 
villages with 26 natural villages were administered at the beginning of 2005. The surveys 
collected detailed information on household and individual demographics, income, consumption, 
transfers, expenditures and incomes related to giving gift, wedding, and funeral. Information was 
collected for each household member, including members that were working outside the county 
at the time of the surveys. Besides detailed information on social spending, we collected 
household blood donation data. Blood donation information was accurate since each time income 
from blood donation consisted of a large amount relative to their annual income per capita. 
Besides, this behavior did not frequently happen, which guaranteed a clear memory. 
To analyze the causal factors of blood donation, a follow-up survey of the same households 
was administered in early 2007 and 833 households was conducted. However, this second wave 
of survey was halted by the local government when we were trying to collect blood donation data. 
We ended up collecting blood donation information from only two thirds of samples. Meanwhile, 
in 2006, local blood donation stations were shut down due to Hepatitis C contamination and 
predatory behavior of over extracting blood plasma. In order to have a more realistic 
understanding of blood market in Guizhou, we only adopt the blood donation data from the 2005 
survey, but we also use ex post information on social events and shocks from the 2007 survey to 
capture blood donation behavior in 2004. 
5.2 Village and Household Summary Statistics 
Table 1 and Table 2 present summary statistics, less variable and more variable respectively, 
for the three administrative villages.  In Table 1, the larger distance to county seat renders 
                                                 
10 This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University. 
11 More than 20 ethnic groups are living in Puding county, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and yi. In total, ethnic 
minorities comprise about 20% of population.   - 20 -
administrative village 1 significantly fewer marketing opportunities. Thus, the proportion of 
households with migrants rose from 31% to 50% during the study period. In contrast, migration 
fell sharply in the second administrative village as new on-farm opportunities developed with the 
new road. A smaller share of households in the third administrative villages includes migrants. 
Instead, over 60% of the households in village 1 have members employed off-farm, whereas less 
than half of the households in the other villages do. Meanwhile, the share of minority households 
in village 1 is overwhelmingly higher than the other two. Family members in village 1 also 
experience significantly fewer average school years. 
Table 2 provides the FGT measures which show that head-count index, poverty gap, and 
squared poverty gap under both the high poverty line and the low poverty line are uniformly 
larger for village 1 and village 2. Compared to village 1 and 2, village 3 has much higher per 
capita income and income growth, higher percentage of flat land, higher land rental rate, higher 
values of home appliances, and easier access to drinking water.  
Income inequality and expenditure inequality in village 2 from 2004 to 2006 are the highest 
among all three villages. Seen from income and consumption inequality decomposition, farming 
and local non-farm jobs (part-time job and wage job) are the largest income inequality 
contributors, while food and medical care are the largest expenditure inequality contributors. 
However, the role played by farming and food in determining inequality are much smaller than 
their income shares. Remittance is a large contributor to income inequality compared to its 
income share. Inflows of remittances to some households set in motion status contests with 
adverse consequences of the others through their long-term blood donation (Brown et al., 2008). 
If this is the case, we need to worry about the current unequal migration opportunities and its 
negative impacts on local residents. Blood donation itself is poverty reducing as well as 
inequality alleviating. Gift income is relatively inequality reducing, and gift and festival 
spending is inequality increasing. 
5.3 Statistical analysis of Blood Donation 
At the village level, compared to village 1 and village 2, village 3 has smaller share of 
households donating blood. Table 3 shows that in 2004 respectively 41%, 29%, and 20% of 
households in three interviewed villages in 2004 donated blood, which represents 9% of annual   - 21 -
income to the mean household.
12 Actually, both in 2004 and 2006, participation rates of blood 
donation are the highest in village 1, while it is the lowest in village 3. Meanwhile, median and 
the distribution of blood donation income in village 2 is the largest. It is also true for mean per 
capita blood donation in village 2 that mean per capita blood donation are 197, 235.5, and 113.4 
for three administrative villages respectively. Considering the unique market price of blood 
donation the three villages face, it means that on average per capita blood donation are 1000cc 
per year in volume. Among the three villages, village 2 ranks the first in blood donation volume 
per capita, with village 1 and village 3 rank the second and the third respectively. However, at 
natural village level, more natural villages in administrative village 1 have positive median per 
capita blood income than the other two administrative villages. In general, data from all villages 
show that the lower per capita Income, the higher income ratio of blood donation (Figure 4).  
Income inequality and consumption inequality in village 2 from 2004 to 2006 are the 
highest among all three villages. Poverty simulation excluding blood donation income shows 
large percentage increases in FGT measures. The percentage changes are the highest for village 1 
and village 3 (Table 4). Graphically, Figure 1 illustrates poverty situation in the three villages 
before and after deducting blood donation compensation.
13 After excluding the compensation, 
the Gini coefficient is even higher for the three villages in both years, which indicates that blood 
donation behavior actually mitigates unequal distribution. Inequality decomposition verifies that 
blood donation reduce income inequality, since it accounts for 10.9% of total income but 
contributes only 1.8 to total inequality. 
What are the factors that influence household blood donation decisions? One of the direct 
answers might come from policy enforcement. China regulates that people more than 50 years 
old, less than 50kgs (male), less than 45kgs (female), or people seriously disabled, are not 
eligible to donate blood plasma. However, the only regulation that is generally effective is 
through preventing seriously disabled blood donor.
14 Blood donation usually reflect households’ 
                                                 
12 We also conducted a natural village level survey (Table 4), which shows that in 2004 23% of the households had 
blood donation experience, smaller than 28% in the household level survey. However, village level survey shows 
that in 11% of the households sold blood in 2006, while in the household survey it corresponds to 7%. On average, 
in 2004 12 households in each natural village treated blood donation as a stable income source, which reduced to 6.4 
in 2006. 
13 The left vertical line denotes low poverty line (668 RMB), and the right vertical line denotes high poverty line 
(892 RMB). 
14 Regulations through other channels are not efficient because people in Guizhou are normally shorter and lighter 
than people in many other provinces. Faced with the huge demand for blood, it is not easy to enforce the age and   - 22 -
collective decisions, which mean that if any of the family members is able to donate blood, the 
household might turn out to be a blood provider. T-test shows that if all family members are 
seriously disabled, this household is less likely to donate blood, though it is not statistically 
significant. It is consistent with the fact that in the local blood donation station there are people 
seriously disabled donating blood (CHAIN, 2006). T-test also shows that seriously disabled 
households significantly live under poverty. Most of these families are named “five guaranteed 
family”, and they receive government poverty subsidies. 
Cash shortage might be another reason behind blood donation, especially when peasants are 
in their sowing season. Meanwhile, in some rural areas that are endowed with less land, local 
residents rely on donating blood to survive winters when food is in shortage. With limited 
opportunities to migrate out, we might find people with less land donate more blood. During the 
interview, some respondents told us that through donating blood they could avoid starvation 
when they were faced with food shortage. T-test shows that the relationships between per capita 
farmland and blood donation and its volume are negative, and the latter link is stronger.  
Further, given that off-farm work opportunities are limited and people don’t realize the long 
term effect of donating blood towards health outcomes, their initial blood donation decision to 
win “easy cash” may end up with reliance on blood donation in the long run, because they 
gradually feel lack of energy to do farm work. T-test shows that whether to donate blood or not 
and donation volume have a significantly negative relationship with low per capita farm income. 
A public accepted view is that migration alleviates and finally eliminates the blood donation 
behavior, since they have more profitable alternatives to choose and more knowledge about 
health issues. However, our t-test shows that higher share of family members who migrate is 
associated with more blood donation volume and there is no relationship between migration and 
blood donation participation. This initial result might suggest that we are not at the turning point. 
An interesting question would be whether a minority systematically differs from a Han 
person. Brown et al. (2008) find that minority people are significantly less likely to participate in 
social status competition, and here it is interesting to test whether being a minority is more/ less 
likely to donate blood. The result shows that minority people are significantly more likely to 
donate blood than their Han counterparts. Unlike gift-giving, donating blood seems to show no 
                                                                                                                                                             
weight regulations. For more information, refer to China HIV/AIDS Information Network 
(http://www.chain.net.cn/).   - 23 -
culture shock between the Han group and other minorities. Blood donation compensation is 
treated as “easy cash” from all local community members, even more for minority groups. 
Another thought provoking question is whether party member are less likely to donate 
blood, since intuitively their special political and social power should help them avoid this 
depressing behavior. We verify that party members generally have higher income and receive 
more education. However, the t-test between blood donation participation sample and non-
participation sample shows that party members are significantly more likely to donate blood and 
donate more volume. 
Social spending especially cash expenditure might also influence peasants’ blood donation 
decisions, which is the main topic of this paper and will be extensively discussed. Besides, big 
shocks and future social events might also be relevant. However, on top of all these possible 
reasons, blood donation should essentially be a phenomenon of poverty, inequality, and 
deprivation.  
5.4 Social Spending and Gift Giving 
In Table 2, gift income as a share of total income rise by 41% in village 1, and rise by an 
amazing 127% in village 3. Among distributions of per capita gift expenditure and the median, 
village 3 is the largest. The share of gift expenditure and festival spending increases nearly 80% 
from 7% to 12%, surpassing education expenditure. Compared with income growth between 
2004 and 2006, gift spending has higher growth rate. 
Table 3 provides more detailed information on gift exchange. It includes all kinds of gift 
expenditures in different social occasions, but it excludes other non-gift expenditures occur 
during social events or shocks, such as weddings, funerals, big diseases, natural disaster, 
livestock deaths, college entrances, and child births. Those non-gift social expenditures usually 
occur in weddings and funerals, which will be extensively illustrated in Table 5 and Table 6. 
From 2004 to 2006, the participation rate of gift giving increases by 50% on average, with 
median per capita gift expenditure increases by nearly 4 times on average. Median gift per 
occasion that is given to direct relatives is much more than given to friends and neighbors, with a 
roughly equal increasing rate of 50% on average. On average, people sent out gift twice in 2006. 
Comparing median gift for male side and female side between 2001 and 2006, the male/female 
ratio of median gift expenditure per occasion converged, while in absolute value median gift per 
occasion for male side is still much higher than median gift for female side.    - 24 -
In the 2007 wave of survey, we collected recall data for social spending in the last ten 
years.
15 Gift expenditure and income in different social occasions were also collected. From gift 
receivers’ records, we list in Table 5 gift income due to the marriage of each son in grooms’ 
family and marriage of each daughter in brides’ family. We also provide gift value in funerals of 
each family members died during that period. Although weddings and funerals do not often 
happen in the three villages, from Table 5 it is clear that gift expenditures per occasion during 
those major social events kept soaring in the last ten years.  
Relative derivation research solely based on gift-giving might greatly the negative 
positional externality, many other social spending might also take major effects. In China, gift 
expenditure is just a small part of total social spending, while holding social occasions such as 
wedding and funeral usually call for much larger amount of cash expenditure.  
Traditionally, on the one hand, the groom’s family is responsible for paying bride price, 
which is often accompanied by gifts to the bride herself and huge expenditure holding the 
wedding ceremony. On the other hand, the bride’s parents usually send out dowry to the bride. 
Usually, huge dowry spending competitions exist in order to help the bride gain more equal 
status within the new family. Table 6 illustrates that the median wedding expenditure in the last 
ten years has had a median year-on-year increase of 17% in the three villages, far exceeding per 
capita income in its growth rate and its absolute value. On the bride’s family side, there has been 
a less prominent but significant growth during those years. 
Funerals usually provide another opportunity for status competition both for the decedent’s 
family and its relatives and friends. Funerals typically last several days, which involve all kinds 
of things from simple meals to fancy banquets. Table 6 shows a steadily large amount of 
spending and rapidly increasing trend.  
If we further consider the massive house building campaign before marriage, the burden of 
social spending is even worse. Usually, the groom’s family is responsible for building a house 
(“Xi Fang”) for the new couple, which renders an expense far exceeds even the total cost of 
wedding ceremony. In the three villages, it is easily seen that a lot of Xi Fang are empty because 
the new couple migrate out to work. Nonetheless, the house is purposed to be built to show 
social status of parents from both sides. 
                                                 
15 For social spending, most of rural households usually keep detailed record of involved names, expenditures, and 
gift sent out or received. In this way, local people can keep track of informal network around them. Thus, the recall 
error is low, even over a long period.      - 25 -
 
6. Empirical Results 
Table 7 through Table 13 provide us with empirical test of blood donation decision. We 
highlight the role of status concern and how inequality, relative deprivation, and other people’s 
behavior influence an individual’s decision.  
6.1 Relative Deprivation, Status Seeking, and Blood Donation Participation 
Table 7 presents logit regression results for eight specifications and shows what determine 
whether or not a household donates blood. We include in each estimation per capita income 
excluding blood donation compensation to control household resources. Gini coefficient is also 
calculated after excluding blood donation compensation. Deaton (2001)’s relative deprivation 
measure, poverty line, interactive term between poverty and per capita income,  blood donation 
participation rate, gift giving participation rate, and median level of blood donation volume in the 
reference group are included in the model. Other regressors include Household head’s education 
level, ethnicity, whether he/she is a party member, the share of family members who migrate out 
to work, fixed effect at the level of administrative village, whether or not a household in poverty 
has member(s) in serious illness, and whether or not all family members are seriously disabled.   
Four major results are summarized. First, we confirm that blood donation behavior is a 
reflection of poverty. As per capita income increases, households are significantly less likely to 
participate in donating blood. Meanwhile, households under poverty line are more likely to 
donate blood.
16 The significance of interactive term between poverty and per capita income 
shows that the deeper a household is in poverty, the more chance it participates in donating blood.  
Second, we find that inequality on natural village level matters. Seen from model I and II, 
the more unequal it is in the local community, the more likely people donate blood. Even if the 
Gini coefficient are not significant in model III and IV, however, considering the possible 
simultaneity problem, Gini coefficient in the model without blood donation participation rate and 
median level of blood donation volume is still significant in driving blood donation participation. 
Third, Gini coefficient can only capture village level inequality, while people with different 
income within a village might feel quite differently. That is why relative deprivation measures 
and other status competition information are needed. In Table 7, relative deprivation index 
                                                 
16 The results below are robust to substituting the higher official poverty line (892RMB) for the presented lower 
poverty line (668RMB).   - 26 -
offered by Deaton (2001) is included. Results show that there is significantly positive effect of 
being relatively deprived on blood donation participation (also refer to Figure 3). The 
significance of relative deprivation index is robust to the specification when we do not include 
blood donation participation rate, median level of blood donation, gift giving participation rate, 
and median level of gift spending. 
Fourth, to capture social status seeking, we adopt gift giving participation rate within each 
natural village to describe positional spending in the reference group.
17 We find that gift giving 
participation rate within the reference group significantly increases the likelihood of blood 
donation participation. Besides, blood donation participation rate and median level of blood 
donation within the reference group strengthen blood donation behavior. 
After controlling for the aforementioned factors, the fact that a household in poverty with 
member(s) in serious illness still has significantly positive effect on blood donation participation, 
while the fact that all family members are disabled deters family from donating blood. This 
finding informs us the labor allocation strategy that families allocate their labor resource to blood 
donation as long as not all family members are seriously disabled. 
It is also found that residents in administrative village 3 are less likely to donate blood, 
which might be caused by more work opportunities exposed there. Minority-headed households 
are no less active in donating blood than ethnic Han households, no matter whether village fixed 
effect variables are included or not, suggesting no large culture shock of attitudes towards 
donating blood. The share of migrants in a household has no significant effect on blood donation 
decision, perhaps implying that the positive effect from migration has not been large enough to 
drive people to the critical point. There might be fewer farm labors within a household after 
partial migration, which induces blood donation to be one of their possible choices. Another 
interesting finding shows that families with party members are more likely to donate blood, 
which is counterintuitive because village party members in China usually have more political 
and socioeconomic power than the others. Therefore, it deserves our further attention. 
We are centrally interested in whether and how people are relatively deprived in the 
perspectives of both income and consumption and driven into donating blood. Table 8 presents 
five major relative deprivation indexes. The Deaton (2001)’s index and Li & Zhu (2006)’s RDI 
                                                 
17 In some scenarios, whether a household participates in gift giving is adopted and used to check whether it is 
consistent with other relevant indicators, but it may suffer from simultaneity problem.  Thus, we do not report the 
result here.   - 27 -
index, the most composite relative deprivation indexes, are significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Two less composite indexes, Wildman (2003b)’s index and Li & Zhu (2006)’s RDA index 
are significant at 95% confidence level when we incorporate blood donation participation rate at 
natural village level into the model. The Rank index conveys the least information on relative 
deprivation. Therefore, it is not significant in influencing blood donation participation. It is 
important that after controlling for relative deprivation from the perspective of income, other 
deprivation indicators such as blood donation participation rate and gift giving participation rate 
within the reference group significantly determine blood donation participation. Other regressors 
have similar influence as in Table 7 in terms of signs and degrees. 
6.2 Relative Deprivation, Status Seeking, and Blood Donation Volume  
While logit estimation provides us with useful information on which households donate 
blood, we are now interested in how these factors influence the level of blood donation. Since 
576 households (71.8%) report no record of blood donation, we employ a tobit model for this 
analysis.  
In Table 10, models I to IV verify that blood donation behavior are a reflection of poverty. 
Households with lower per capita income tend to donate more blood. Households under poverty 
line generally donate more blood.
18 The significance of interactive term between poverty and per 
capita income shows that the deeper a household is in poverty, the more blood it donates. 
Meanwhile, the eight specifications in Table 10 show that the level of blood donation is 
much less a village level inequality issue than an individually relative deprivation issue. If we do 
not incorporate the idea of relative deprivation, redistribution policies might be deviated to the 
wrong route. Besides, village blood donation participation rate and median level of blood 
donation are incorporated. To capture social status seeking, we adopt gift giving participation 
rate and median level gift spending within the natural village to describe positional spending in 
the reference group. Results show that there is significantly positive effect of being relatively 
deprived on blood donation volume. Blood donation participation rate and median level of blood 
donation within the reference group increase the level of blood donation. Gift giving 
participation rate and median level gift spending within the reference group also increase the 
volume of blood donation. The significance of relative deprivation variable is robust to other 
                                                 
18 The results below are robust to substituting the higher official poverty line (892RMB) for the presented lower 
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specifications, such as without blood donation participation rate, median level of blood donation, 
gift giving participation rate, and median level of gift spending. 
Other results show that households with child in school generally donate less blood. The 
share of household members who migrate out has positive effect on blood donation volume. 
Residents in village 3 tend to donate significantly less volume of blood. Interestingly, party 
members tend to donate more blood. However, the fact that a household in poverty with 
member(s) in serious illness and that all family members are disabled have no significant effect 
on blood donation volume. 
How are people relatively deprived and driven into donating more blood? Table 10 and 
Table 11 present three most composite relative deprivation indexes. The Deaton (2001)’s index 
and Li & Zhu (2006)’s RDI index are significant at the 95% confidence level. The less 
composite Wildman (2003b)’s index is partially significant at 90% confidence level when we 
incorporate blood donation participation rate or median level of blood donation at natural village 
level. It is important that after controlling for relative deprivation from the perspective of income, 
other deprivation indicators such as blood donation participation rate, median level blood 
donation, gift giving participation rate, and median level gift expenditure within the reference 
group significantly determine blood donation level. 
6.3 Shock, Social Events, and Blood Donation 
Table 9 presents determinants of blood donation participation considering shocks and big 
social events. Major findings are similar to we learned from Table 7 and Table 8. First, blood 
donation behavior is a reflection of poverty. Second, blood donation participation reflects 
inequality on natural village level. Even if the Gini coefficient are not significant in model II and 
VI, however, considering the possible simultaneity problem, Gini coefficient in the model 
without blood donation participation rate is significant in driving blood donation participation. 
Third, as an indispensable complement to the Gini coefficient, Deaton (2001)’s relative 
deprivation index significantly forces people to participate. The significance of Deaton (2001) 
index is robust to the specification when there are no blood donation participation rate and gift 
giving participation rate. Finally, to capture social status seeking, we adopt gift giving 
participation rate within each natural village to describe positional spending in the reference 
group, and we find its significantly positive effects on blood donation participation. Blood 
donation participation rate within the reference group strengthen blood donation behavior.    - 29 -
 All of the eight models in Table 9 further consider the impact of shocks, large social events 
on blood donation participation. We find that shocks or events that lead to blood donation 
participation should occur suddenly and without expectation. For instance, we find that deaths of 
livestock significantly induce household to donate blood, which might be because it greatly 
affects farming, especially in mountainous regions. It is also found that the influences of 
livestock death on blood donation participation disappear after two years.      
To the contrary, marriages of male or female family members, house building, and family 
member death in the past one or two years cause no significant blood donation participation. In 
parallel, marriages of male or female family members and house building in the next one or two 
years cause no significant blood donation participation neither. People may think that family 
member death can be out of expectation. It is true only in very few cases, while in many more 
cases family members die in old ages with large amount of precautionary savings paying for 
funeral fees and possible medical treatment. This is especially true in the Chinese culture where 
people have rooted tradition to save for funeral costs. Meanwhile, people exchange gifts in social 
events such as weddings, funerals, college entry, and house building (Table 5). Therefore, large 
expenditure is smoothed with no significant impact on blood donation participation. 
Table 12 and Table 13 present determinants of blood donation level considering shocks and 
big social events. Based on Table 10, it is verified that 1) differentiated levels of blood donation 
are a reflection of poverty; 2) the level of blood donation is much less a village level inequality 
issue than a reflection of individually relative deprivation. The significance of Deaton (2001) 
index is robust to other specifications, such as without blood donation participation rate, median 
level of blood donation, gift giving participation rate, and median level of gift spending; 3) gift 
giving participation rate and median level gift spending in the reference group significantly 
capture social status seeking. Household blood donation volume increases in the median level of 
blood donation within the reference group. 
The major difference between Table 12 and Table 13 is that in Table 12 we employ dummy 
variables testing shocks and big social events, while in Table 13 we apply actual expenditure 
variables measuring shocks and big social events. However, both of these two settings convey 
the same major conclusions as from Table 9. Comparing other results in Table 12 and Table 13 
to Table 9, the positive effect of family member(s) in serious illness and all family members 
seriously disabled on blood donation disappears. In other words, the two factors only influence   - 30 -
blood donation participation but not the level of participation. 
Finally, Figure 14 shows initial evidence of relative concern and blood donation using 
survey data from 2004 to predict household behavior in 2006. In this way, we are able to get rid 
of simultaneity issue. Indicators of herd behavior and effects of positional competition 
significantly aggravate blood donation participation. Besides, relative deprivation measures are 
significant. Household income excluding blood donation might be potentially endogenous 
because households can allocate labor resources across different income activities. We apply 
non-owned income such as remittance to be a proxy and find it not significant.     
 
7. Initial Conclusions 
Recent evidence from developing countries has shown that relative concern over the others’ 
consumption matters. Rural China serves as an ideal destination to observe relative concern and 
closely related social phenomenon in readily identifiable reference groups because of closed ties 
among relatives and neighbors, isolation from outside market, mountainous geographic 
conditions among villages, and rapid economic and social transformation with worsening 
inequality and deepening poverty. In rural China, the fierce race for social status has brought in 
overconsumption of positional goods originally used to facilitate informal social networks. The 
fact that households allocate too much resource to positional goods, instead of non-positional 
goods, contributes to an overall loss of welfare. The concern is even strengthened when 
households living close to subsistence are compelled to donate blood to keep up with the Jones.  
Applying a census-type household survey data in 2004 and some information from 2006 
survey, there are five major findings based on our preliminary analysis. First, we confirm that 
blood donation behavior is a reflection of poverty, and as per capita income of households in 
poverty decreases, they are significantly more likely to donate blood. Second, blood donation 
reflect income inequality, including inequality that everyone feels the same and relative 
deprivation that everyone feels differently. The result is robust to different measures of relative 
deprivation. In some scenarios, relative deprivation significantly affects blood donation while 
inequality does not. It deserves further attention whether the underlying inequality effect is 
concealed when designing or evaluating policies. Third, the motive of social status seeking is 
also seen intensified through positional spending, which is measured and found to aggravate 
blood donation. Fourth, the herd effect of blood donation exists, which suggests that individual   - 31 -
blood donation decision is significantly influenced by people around them, and individual agents 
are weak in making own decisions. Finally, shortly after shocks such as unanticipated gift giving 
expenditure and livestock death, people are significantly more likely to donate blood, while for 
covering anticipated social expenditure such as house building and wedding, people do not 
significantly engage in blood donation before and afterwards. 
We also conclude that people draw blood from their bodies to meet the immediate needs in 
unanticipated social occasions and production shocks. Continuous blood donation in the long run 
might partially come out of little access to cash credit to smooth income and consumption in 
impoverished areas where status seeking prevail or when production related shocks occur. The 
displaced distortion of financing constraints manifest itself in allocative inefficiency that may 
lead researchers and policymakers to mistakenly conclude that poor households routinely make 
serious allocation errors and to direct policy interventions towards the symptoms manifest in 
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Note: The two vertical lines “L” and “H” refer to the low and high poverty lines. 
 
Figure 2 Computing Relative Deprivation from Distribution of Income (Deaton, 2001) 
   - 36 -










0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative Deprivation Measure (Deaton, 2001)












0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Relative Deprivation Measure (Deaton, 2001)
95% CI Fitted values
Pr(blood donation participation)
 
Note: The left figure and right figure respectively show their relationship using equation (13) without / with 
potential effects of shocks and social events. 
 








0 5000 10000 15000
per capita income
95% CI Fitted values








0 5000 10000 15000
per capita income
95% CI Fitted values
ratio of income from blood donation
 
Note: The left figure includes households that do not donate blood.   37
Table 1. Summary Statistics by Three Administrative Villages (2004) 
  Village 1  Village 2  Village 3  Total 
Number of natural villages  11  5  10  26 
Distance to county seat (km)  10  8  2.5  6.8 
Number of households  257  151  393  801 
Total  population  1089 535 1449  3073 
Share of minority households (%)  76.6  12.6  6.7  30.8 
Share of household members aged 60 and above (%)  14.2  17.9  12.5  14.1 
Share of households with migrants (%)  30.7  55  43.3  41.4 
Share of household members who migrate (%)  12.3  13.5  12  12.4 
Male head of household (%)  93.5  94.8  91.6  92.8 
Education of household head (years)  2.87  3.06  3.98  4.44 
Household average year of schooling  2.19  2.67  3.67  2.97 
Per capita cultivated land (mu)  0.87  0.86  1.1  0.98 
Percentage of flat land (%)  40  20.7  80  53.4 
Land rental rate (Yuan per mu)  30  50  100  60 
Share of households with TV (%)  39.3  39.7  61.6  50.3 
Share of households with bicycles or motorcycles (%)  2.3  3.3  19.3  10.9 
Share of households with phones (%)  8.9  15.2  23.4  17.2 
Having difficulty with access to drinking water  79.4  80.1  39.2  59.9 
Share of households with local non-farm jobs (%)  49.5  43.7  66.5  56.6 
Share of households with self-employment (%)  7.4  3.3  7.4  6.6 
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Table 2. Income, Consumption , and Inequality Decomposition by Three Administrative Villages (2004, 2006)   
    Village 1  Village 2  Village 3  Total  Inequality 
Decomposition 
    2004  2006  2004  2006  2004 2006  2004  2006           2004 (%) 
Per capita annual income (RMB)  1381  1455  1648  2094  2089 2848  1779  2232   
Per capita consumption (RMB)*  818  1270  1125  1652  1562 2375  1223  1854   
Income inequality (Gini)  42.4  45.3  42.3 52.0  40.2 42.8  43.1  48.2   
Consumption  inequality  (Gini)  35.3 33.9 39 36.1  33.4 30.6 38.1  36   
Income inequality excluding blood donation  (Gini)  46.6  46.9 44.7 52.5 42.4 43  46.3  49   
Income below low poverty line of 668 RMB (%)    (P0)  37.6  37.9  30.1 32.4  13.2 12.6  24.8  25.1   
poverty-gap below low poverty line (P1)  14.2  15.4  9.2  11  4.4  4.3  8.7  9.4   
squared poverty-gap below low poverty line (P2)  7.2  8.9  3.7  5.5  2  2  4.1  5.1   
Income below high poverty line of 892 RMB (%)    (P0)  54.1  52.5  41.1 44.1  23.4 21.1  37.3  36.3   
poverty-gap below high poverty line (P1)  22.4  23.3  15.8 17.9  8.1  7.5  14.5  15   
squared poverty-gap below high poverty line (P2)  12.2  13.6  7.7  9.6  3.9  3.7  7.5  8.3   
   
Sources of Income (%)                 100 
Agriculture  51.4  51.2 48.4 52.7 49.3 37.9  49.8  45  31 
Farming  37.5  30.2 37.5 38.4 42.9 31  40.3  32  24.6 
Livestock  13.9 21.1  10.8 14.4 6.4  6.9  9.5  13  6.3 
Non-agriculture  27.2 36.8  21.8 27 36.4 49.9 30.7  41.2  62.6 
Local non-farm jobs (part time job and wage job)  16.5 10.4 5.6  10.2  24.6 29.4 18.4  19.4  28.7 
Self employment  2.6  3.7 5.7 6.5 4.9  10  4.4  7.3  18.6 
Remittance from migrants outside the county  8.1 22.7  10.5 10.3  6.9  10.5 7.9  14.5  15.3 
Disaster relief, anti-poverty programs, and deforestation 
subsidies  5.2 2.9  2.4 7 1.8  0.4  3  2.5  0.5   39
Gift  income  3.2  4.5 11.7 11.6 4.9 11.1  5.6  9.1  4.1 
Blood donation income  13  4.6  15.7 1.7  7.6  0.7  10.9  2.2  1.8 
                       
Expenditures (%)                   100 
Food  61  54.4  50.6 46.8 48 42.9 52.6  47.5  23.8 
Clothing  4  4.1 3.2 3.5 4.4 4.6  4.1  4.2  3.2 
Medical  care  14.5  15.7 24.5 16.9 17.4 14.4  17.8  15.3  30.1 
Education 7.1  9.4  8.4  11.3  9.5  11.4  8.5  10.7  6.1 
Gift and festival spending  5.5  8.6  5.9  12.9  8.4  14.7  7  12.3  8.9 
Others 7.9  7.8  7.4  8.6  12.3 12  10  10  27.9 
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Table 3. Gift Exchange Expenditure and Blood Donation Compensation by Three Villages (2004,2006) 
    Village 1  Village 2  Village 3  Total 
    2004 2006 2004  2006  2004  2006 2004  2006 
Participation rate in Donating blood (%)  40.9 12.8 29.1  5.7  19.5 3.8 28.2 7.2 
Mean per capita blood donation  (RMB)  197 56.6  235.5 22.4 113.4 11  163.2 28.6 
Cash compensation (nutrition subsidy) for Blood  donation  (RMB/500cc)**  80  80  80 80 80  80  80  80 
Participation rate in gift giving (%)*  59.1  85.1 57  91.8 66.7  95.4 62.4  91.2 
Median per capita gift expenditure  (RMB)*  16 62.5 20  150  80  250 33.3  150 
                   
Median gift to direct relatives (RMB per occasion)  30  50  30  50  50  100 40  60 
Median gift to friends/neighbors (RMB per occasion)  10  20  15  30  25  50  20  30 
Times of Sending out gift in 2006  -  2.1  -  2.4  -  2.9  -  2.5 
Median gift for male side (RMB per occasion)  -  50  -  50  -  100 -  50 
Median gift for female side (RMB per occasion)  -  20  -  30  -  50  -  30 
                     
Median gift for male side in 2001 (RMB per occasion)  30  30  50  40 
Median gift for female side in 2001 (RMB per occasion)  10  17.5  20  20 
* “Gifts” exclude spending on weddings and funerals.             
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Table 4. Percentage Change in Poverty and Inequality under the Simulation of Excluding Blood Donation income (2004) 
  P0 P1 P2  Gini 
Admin Village 1  32.8  54.7  71.9  9.6 
Admin Village 2  18.6  46.1  86  5.8 
Admin Village 3  32.5  61.3  91.2  5.3 




Table 5. Median Gift Received (RMB) in Different Social Occasions from 1996 to 2006 (per occasion)* 
Year  Wedding: Groom's Family  Wedding: Bride's Family  Funeral 
 
    1st son  2nd son  3rd son  1st daughter  2nd daughter  3rd daughter  1st  2nd 
1996 900  -  -  -  1000  -  500 - 
1997 500  0  -  -  1000  -  1200 - 
1998 0  0  -  0  -  -  1500  0 
1999 0  0  0  0  -  -  1500  - 
2000 0  -  -  0  -  -  2250  1600 
2001 2500  1150  -  -  -  150  1200 - 
2002 850  0  -  400  900  -  2000  1000 
2003 2250  0  4050  240  -  -  2000  1200 
2004 2100  2800  -  -  -  -  2200  2000 
2005 1200  -  -  -  0  -  2000 - 
2006 4800  -  -  3500  1250  -  1850  5000 
* In other social occasions such as big diseases, natural disasters, and college entrances more and more local residents also exchange gifts. 
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Table 6. Median Marriage and funeral Expenditures (RMB) from 1996 to 2006* 
Year  Wedding: Groom's Family  Wedding: Bride's Family  Funeral 
    Brideprice  Gift to bride  Ceremony  Total Expenditure Dowry  Ceremony  Total Expenditure  Total Expenditure
1996 2500  2000  2000  6500  0  1000  1000  1750 
1997 3000  1800  2000  6800  1000  0  1000  3000 
1998 3500  2000  2250  7750  1100  500  1600  3000 
1999 2000  1800  2000  5800  300  0  300  3200 
2000 3000  2000  2500  7500  2000  150  2150  3000 
2001 3000  3000  3000  9000  2000  0  2000  3000 
2002 4800  4250  2400  11450  400  0  400  2850 
2003 3000  3500  3000  9500  1900  500  2400  3850 
2004 8000  2500  3500  14000  -**  -**  -**  6000 
2005 9500  5250  3700  18450  2000  0  2000  5000 
2006 8800  5600  3750  18150  2250 3500  5750  5000 
* Using Recall data from the 2007 survey 
** No wedding was held for that category during that year.         - 43 -
Table 7 Logit Regression on Blood Donation Participation in 2004 
    I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.000**  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median blood donation 
income (natural village) 
    0.011***       0.010***
    (0.003)        (0.002) 
Blood donation participation 
rate (natural village) 
   5.559***    5.164***  
   (0.851)     (0.748)   
Gift giving participation 
rate (natural village) 
  2.035**     1.581*    
  (0.982)      (0.970)    
Median gift spending 
(natural village) 
0.007      0.005     
(0.005)      (0.004)     
Gini coefficient 
(natural village) 
3.659** 3.347**  -1.428  0.137        
1.482 1.493 1.773 1.746        
Relative deprivation 
(Deaton, 2001) 
     1.819*** 1.696*** 1.630*** 1.561***
     0.519 0.531 0.547 0.531 
Poverty line 
 
2.261*** 2.260*** 2.273*** 2.266***       
0.467 0.467 0.480 0.471        
Poverty line*per capita 
income 
-0.004*** -0.004***-0.004***-0.004***       
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001        
Household head 
Education level 
-0.021 -0.019 0.004 -0.016 -0.030 -0.028 -0.012 -0.030 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
Share of household 
members migrate out 
0.566 0.695 0.818 0.603 0.515 0.599 0.753 0.536 
(0.566) (0.567) (0.584) (0.574) (0.564) (0.565) (0.582) (0.573) 
Household head 
ethnicity 
-0.016 0.041  -0.059  -0.064 0.077 0.121 0.055 0.045 
(0.248) (0.245) (0.248) (0.247) (0.241) (0.240) (0.244) (0.242) 
Administrative village 2 
-0.404 -0.348 0.136 -0.014  -0.545** -0.493* 0.041  -0.105 
(0.284) (0.283) (0.300) (0.297) (0.276) (0.277) (0.296) (0.292) 
Administrative village 3 
 
-0.773*** -0.892*** 0.144  -0.575** -1.072*** -1.143***  0.009  -0.714***
(0.270) (0.273) (0.302) (0.273) (0.261) (0.263) (0.303) (0.269) 
Party membership 
 
0.623** 0.606** 0.743** 0.648** 0.676** 0.659** 0.832*** 0.730** 
(0.301) (0.302) (0.307) (0.302) (0.299) (0.300) (0.303) (0.300) 
Household in poverty & 
member in serious illness 
0.510** 0.496** 0.572** 0.550** 0.452*  0.435*  0.462*  0.463* 
(0.248) (0.247) (0.255) (0.250) (0.245) (0.244) (0.252) (0.247) 
All family members 
seriously disabled 
-1.320**  -1.396** -1.462** -1.474** -1.023* -1.066* -1.144* -1.172* 
(0.639) (0.637) (0.635) (0.630) (0.596) (0.598) (0.605) (0.600) 
Observations  796 796 796 796 796 796 796 796 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     - 44 -
Table 8 Logit Regression on Relative Deprivation Measurement and Blood Donation Participation in 2004 
    I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000**  0.000  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000**  -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gift giving participation 
rate (natural village) 
1.581*  1.682* 2.424** 1.682*  1.707*       
(0.972) (1.015) (0.995) (1.015) (0.972)       
Blood donation participation 
rate (natural village) 
      5.164** 5.349***  5.320*  5.349*** 5.295** 
      (0.748) (0.746) (0.744) (0.746) (0.752) 
RDI RD index 
(Li & Zhu, 2006) 
     0.218**       0.225** 
     (0.053)       (0.054) 
RDA RD index 
(Li & Zhu, 2006) 
    0.000       0.001*   
    (0.000)       (0.000)   
Rank RD index     0.003       0.002    
   (0.002)       (0.002)    
Wildman RD index 
(Wildman, 2003b) 
  0.000       0.001*     
  (0.000)       (0.000)     
Deaton RD index 
(Deaton, 2001) 
1.696***       1.630***      
(0.531)       (0.547)      
Household 
Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household Head 
Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Village  Fixed  Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  796 796 796 796 795 796 796 796 796 795 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Y denotes that the factors are controlled.  - 45 -
Table 9 Shocks, Social Events and Blood Donation Participation 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.000**  -0.000**  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000*  -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gift giving participation 
rate (natural village) 
2.794*    2.261**    2.791*    2.265**  
(1.114)    (1.101)    (1.115)    (1.102)  
Blood donation participation 
rate (natural village) 
  5.972**    5.446***    6.033**    5.493** 
  (0.960)    (0.828)    (0.961)    (0.829) 
Gini coefficient 
(natural village) 
3.6494** -2.030     3.6886** -2.1102     
(1.721) (2.086)     (1.721) (2.089)     
Deaton RD index 
(Deaton, 2001) 
   1.895** 1.838***     1.891** 1.822*** 
   (0.600) (0.628)     (0.601) (0.629) 
Poverty line 
 
2.325** 2.297**      2.318***  2.292***     
(0.538) (0.555)     (0.538)  (0.556)    
Livestock death 
1 year ago 
0.595* 0.537* 0.550*  0.469      
(.302) (.313) (.299) (.311)         
Poverty line*per capita 
income 
-0.004***  -0.004***    -0.004***  -0.004***    
(0.001) (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)    
Social Events 
(1 year ago) 
Y Y Y Y         
Social Events 
(1 year later) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Social Events 
(2 years ago) 
     Y  Y  Y  Y 
Other Shocks 
(1 year ago) 
Y Y Y Y         
Other Shocks 
(2 years ago) 
     Y  Y  Y  Y 
Household Head 
Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household 
Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Village  Fixed  Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 Tobit Regression on Blood Donation Volume in 2004 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.117* -0.116**  -0.109***  -0.101*  -0.073  -0.082  -0.075  -0.067 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.054)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.051) 
Median blood donation 
inc (natural village) 
      4.127***      3.811*** 
      (1.191)      (1.052) 
Blood donation parti. 
rate (natural village) 
   2,375.000***      2,160.780***  
   (416.843)       (375.987)   
Median gift giving 
(natural village) 
  4.186*      3.512    
  (2.255)      (2.228)    
Gift giving parti. 
rate (natural village) 
982.443**      837.444*     
(489.786)      (493.639)     
Gini coefficient 
(natural village) 
957.396 651.020  -1,062.190  -302.689      
(755.795) (799.050) (842.598)  (862.158)      
Deaton RD index 
(Deaton, 2001) 
       591.159** 535.03** 547.875**  558.885** 
       (266.929) (276.147) (261.955) (261.390) 
Household head 
Education level 
-19.896  -21.212  -11.525  -19.292 -24.380* -25.892*  -18.275  -25.003* 
(14.994) (14.984) (14.983)  (14.947)  (14.968) (15.013) (14.966) (14.962) 
Share of household 
members migrate out 
606.305** 578.612** 647.806**  561.161** 576.472**  549.272*  634.137**  547.232* 
(282.085) (280.770) (279.589)  (280.031)  (283.946) (283.036) (281.648) (282.286) 
Household head 
Ethnicity 
54.133 43.121  4.304 14.801  85.223 75.483 47.942 56.484 
(121.259) (120.570) (119.091)  (120.274)  (121.649) (121.016) (119.557) (120.645) 
Admin village 2 
1.741 -36.126  214.777  140.123  -52.817  -79.258  181.643  101.224 
(140.337) (139.300) (144.021)  (147.038)  (140.949) (139.597) (145.151) (147.858) 
Admin village 3 
 
-364.776*** -583.231***  95.108 -219.101  -454.197*** -619.594*** 58.345  -263.015* 
(138.024) (205.890) (146.094)  (134.537)  (134.747) (188.702) (149.496) (135.974) 
Party membership 
 
301.383** 286.506* 343.978**  305.116** 333.707**  321.700**  379.980**  342.652** 
(151.164) (150.970) (150.185)  (150.834)  (151.872) (151.798) (151.153) (151.768) 
Poverty line 
 
819.627*** 817.102*** 789.500*** 818.362***     
(214.366) (213.850) (211.873)  (213.455)      
Poverty line* 
per capita income 
-1.578**** -1.576***  -1.577*** -1.609***      
(0.467) (0.466) (0.462) (0.467)      
hh in poverty&member 
in serious illness 
177.063 180.019 188.159  185.016  154.446 154.646 143.978 149.346 
(125.575) (125.740) (124.711)  (125.517)  (125.741) (125.764) (124.786) (125.487) 
All family members 
seriously disabled 
-389.350 -385.352 -383.094  -415.329  -341.428 -331.588 -319.544 -358.963 
(280.023) (278.660) (273.240)  (277.644)  (281.665) (280.533) (274.915) (279.428) 
Observations 796 796 796  796  796 796 796 796 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 11 Relative Deprivation and Blood Donation Volume in 2004 
  I II  III  IV V VI  VII  VIII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.144*** -0.145*** -0.137***  -0.129***  -0.135***  -0.148***  -0.109**  -0.107** 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.051) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046) 
Median blood donation 
inc (natural village) 
      3.981***      4.036*** 
      (1.043)      (1.047) 
Blood donation parti. 
rate (nat. village) 
   2,220.770***     2,235.900***  
   (374.173)     (376.140)   
Median gift giving 
(natural village) 
  4.462**      4.099*    
  (2.127)      (2.479)    
Gift giving parti. 
rate (nat. village) 
1,004.410**      856.206*     
(486.670)      (515.802)     
RDI RD index 
(Li & Zhu, 2006) 
18.752** 18.064** 18.824**  18.110**      
(8.026) (8.025) (7.876) (7.980)      
Wildman RD index 
(Wildman, 2003b) 
       0.141 0.087  0.236*  0.208* 
       (0.135) (0.149) (0.125) (0.127) 
Household head 
Education level 
-23.132 -24.9401* -16.2473  -23.4684  -26.904*  -28.300*  -20.643  -27.550* 
(14.923) (14.947) (14.921)  (14.916)  (14.973) (14.991) (14.979) (14.974) 
Share of household 
members migrate out 
566.726**  539.423* 626.829** 532.357*  534.373*  509.014* 608.313** 514.019* 
(282.960) (281.640) (280.264)  (280.877)  (284.344) (283.264) (281.566) (282.142) 
Household head 
Ethnicity 
81.219  72.159 41.800 48.463 80.416 70.740 49.966 55.722 
(121.073) (120.340) (118.958)  (120.077)  (121.748) (121.022) (119.547) (120.682) 
Admin village 2 
-51.244 -84.084 182.101 102.712  -62.662  -81.431  161.064  87.088 
(140.490) (139.120) (144.619)  (147.266)  (144.040) (142.122) (146.326) (149.072) 
Admin village 3 
 
-434.100*** -653.230***  94.364 -231.879*  -469.919*** -649.710*** 8.184  -307.184** 
(133.008) (187.410) (146.544)  (133.212)  (145.147) (188.334) (158.148) (147.205) 
Party membership 
 
276.739*  264.128* 322.859**  285.966*  330.889** 317.641** 379.537** 339.427** 
(153.666) (153.400) (152.890)  (153.488)  (152.226) (152.133) (151.345) (151.985) 
hh in poverty&member 
in serious illness 
173.609  173.555 160.505 165.307 150.514 155.982 133.566 140.497 
(125.227) (125.170) (124.226)  (125.000)  (126.365) (126.723) (124.891) -(25.691) 
All family members 
seriously disabled 
-310.368 -305.243 -280.825  -318.991  -310.303 -303.148 -297.370 -334.523 
(282.383) (281.040) (274.341)  (279.238)  (283.679) (282.758) (275.612) (280.695) 
Observations 795  795 795 795 796 796 796 796 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 12 Occurrence of Shocks and Big Events, and Blood Donation Volume in 2004 
  I  II  III IV V VI VII VIII  IX  X  XI  XII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.099** -0.105**  -0.084**  -0.047  -0.051  -0.037  -0.098** -0.103**  -0.082*  -0.049  -0.051  -0.038 
(0.043) (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.056) (0.055) (0.053) (0.043) (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.057) (0.055)  (0.053) 
Median blood donation 
income (natural village) 
   3.708***     3.716***    3.754***      3.740*** 
   (1.295)      (1.128)     (1.294)      (1.125) 
Gift giving parti. 
rate (natural village) 
 1,257.730**      1,122.80**     1,239.4**      1,110.509**  
 (525.866)      (528.242)    (525.003)     (527.518)  
Median gift giving 
(natural village) 
3.427     2.837    3.471      2.961     
(2.447)     (2.401)    (2.458)     (2.413)     
Gini coefficient 
(natural village) 
1094.890 1247.810  132.583        1070.270 1243.900  91.169       
(864.355) (816.481)  (944.572)       (864.716) (815.085)  (945.160)       
Deaton RD index 
(Deaton, 2001) 
     639.031** 646.82** 614.676**     614.516** 631.737** 590.489** 
     (293.671) (285.546) (283.250)     (295.622) (286.577)  (284.423) 
Poverty line 
 
741.695*** 747.841*  715.58***       726.10***  734.180*** 699.170***      
(233.481) (233.049)  (233.023)       (233.473) (233.219)  (233.090)       
Poverty line* 
per capita income 
-1.336*** -1.347***  -1.327***       -1.313*** -1.325*** -1.304***       
(0.506) (0.505)  (0.507)        (0.505) (0.504)  (0.506)       
Livestock death 
1 year ago 
235.265*  220.650  215.705 218.985 206.081 195.861             
(142.497) (141.989)  (142.384) (142.841) (142.475) (142.482)           
Shock & Event (1y-)  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y             
Social  Events  (1y+)  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Shock & Event (2y-)              Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
H Head Characteristics  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
H  Characteristics Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Village  Fixed  Effect  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  664  664  664 664 664 664 664  664  664  664  664  664 
Standard errors in parentheses         * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       Y denotes that the factors are controlled.   - 49 -
Table 13 Expenditure on Shocks and Big Events and Blood Donation Volume in 2004 
  I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII 
Per capita income 
(thousand Yuan) 
-0.099**  -0.105**  -0.083*  -0.040 -0.047 -0.033  -0.101**  -0.106**  -0.085**  -0.041 -0.046 -0.034 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.056) (0.055) (0.053) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.056) (0.055) (0.053) 
Median gift giving 
(natural village) 
2.964    2.391    2.953    2.429    
(2.437)     (2.394)     (2.434)    (2.390)    
Gift giving parti. 
rate (natural village) 
 1,186.63**    1,043.90**    1,169.98**    1,029.30**  
 (524.265)    (527.792)    (522.952)    (526.102)  
Median blood donation 
income (natural village 
   3.574***    3.625***    3.572***    3.633*** 
   (1.298)    (1.129)    (1.299)    (1.127) 
Deaton RD index 
(Deaton, 2001) 
    699.241** 693.026** 655.500**     695.215** 693.743** 648.100** 
    (293.976)  (285.986)  (283.438)      (292.722)  (284.589)  (282.490) 
Gini coefficient 
(natural village) 
1188.980  1298.110  217.003      1220.770  1,333.78*  245.437     
(862.504) (813.810) (943.857)        (859.020)  (810.238)  (941.443)     
Poverty line 
 
753.057***  758.486***  731.84***     720.927*** 728.058*** 698.945***    
(231.956) (231.418) (231.446)        (230.816)  (230.421)  (230.287)     
Poverty line* 
per capita income 
-1.335***  -1.342***  -1.331***      -1.273**  -1.280**  -1.268**     
(0.504) (0.503) (0.504)        (0.500) (0.499) (0.501)       
Livestock death 
1 year ago 
0.023  0.019  0.005  0.018  0.015  -0.003        
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.061)        
Shock  &  Event  (1y-)  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y        
Social  Events  (1y+)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Shock  &  Event  (2y-)              Y Y Y Y Y Y 
H  Head  Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
H  Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Village  Fixed  Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Y denotes that the factors are controlled. 
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Table 14 Logit Regression on Blood Donation Participation in 2006 (Robustness Check) 
    I II  III  IV 
Per capita income (thousand Yuan) 
   
-0.000* -0.000** -0.000*  -0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median blood donation income (2004)       0.008* 
    (0.004) 
Blood donation participation rate (2004)      4.552***   
   (1.670)   
Gift giving participation rate (2004)    3.858***   
  (1.55)    
Median gift spending (2004) 
0.011*      
(0.006)      
Relative deprivation (Deaton, 2001)   
1.840** 1.823** 1.762** 1.699** 
(0.830)  (0.801) (0.847) (0.834) 
Household Characteristics  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Household Head Characteristics  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Village Fixed Effect   Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 531  531  531  531 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Y denotes that the factors are controlled. 